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assumed the scope of a text or reference book, the first on the subject." What are its merits and its results?

Dr. Healy's task is not a specially enviable one. He has to pave the way for detail study. On the practical side and on the research side exacting demands are apt to be made, far exceeding the present opportunities. Between the two extremes Dr. Healy is giving us a sensible survey, using chiefly the repeated offender, i.e., the individual most likely to have a personal bias or defect. Comparing the book with such studies as Tarnowsky's *Homicidal Women* or the general works on criminology, one is struck by the close touch with the actual world and a sanely optimistic, progressive, and constructive spirit. The range of problems is staggering. Yet many topics have received a fairly comprehensive treatment with reviews of and guidance into available literature. The style and general exposition are clear and the index very helpful.

With this survey, the ground is prepared for the more clearly monographic treatment of many issues which this book does not claim to settle. It may be that certain critics will feel dissatisfied not to find everywhere a ready-made decision as to what to do next. Healy has very wisely given more space to concrete cases and less to impossible attempts at advising everyone how to make unnecessary the reform of our judicial and penal methods or how to achieve the reforms needed. It is hoped that the book will be widely read and freely consulted; it will not fail to be a most valuable guide, philosopher, and friend to both the practical worker and to the investigator of detail.

Nobody can read this work without becoming convinced of the tremendous importance of giving the individual case the most careful study. It is not for us to judge whether the formal tests will make unnecessary the deeper psychodynamic analysis of each case. A reasonably good study of a reasonable number of cases is the first standard to aim at, and this is what Healy's book shows us how to achieve.

ADOLF MEYER.

The Dread of Responsibility. By ÉMILE FAGUET. Translated from the French by Emily James Putnam. (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1914. Pp. xv, 221.)

M. Faguet is usually thought of as a literary critic, but in recent years he has contributed some very interesting studies to the literature

of French politics. Among these are his *Problèmes Politiques, Le Cult de l'Incompétence and l'Horreur de Responsabilité*, in all of which he subjects the French democracy to a searching criticism. We are now offered a very satisfactory English translation of the last mentioned of these books. The thesis which the author maintains is that what seems to be a dread of responsibility permeates the whole public and private life of the French. It shows itself in their legal ideas and customs, in their professions, and in their political habits and customs. Judges do not decide their cases in accordance with equity, but according to law. This makes them mere clerks or registering machines, and relieves them from all moral responsibility for rendering justice. They have merely to declare the law, and it is therefore the law and not the judge that is responsible. He severely criticizes the present régime as one which places the judiciary under the domination of the executive power, the result of which is that the judges decide as they are directed by the government. The responsibility, therefore, is shifted from the judiciary to the government, at least in all cases in which the government is an interested party. Indeed, he says, judicial power no longer exists in France (70). This criticism is not justified. French judges serve for life and they are irremovable by the government. They are as independent as judges can be, and M. Faguet does not furnish the proof of their subserviency to the government. He also complains of the interference of deputies in judicial matters, but here again his criticism is mere assertion and there is no evidence offered to show that judges in any particular case have been influenced by deputies in reaching their decisions. His criticism of the French Judiciary has been successfully reputed by a writer in the *Revue Politique et Parlementaire* for May 1912. Much of the French procedure is open to criticism but the charges which M. Faguet makes concerning the subserviency of the judges to the government have no foundation.

What he says of the irresponsibility of the judiciary resulting from the jury system is more defensible, but that is inherent in the system of trial by jury, and it is to be found in all countries where the determination of the guilt of the accused rests with the jury rather than with the judge. It is, therefore, not peculiar to France.

Again he asserts that the political constitution of the French at the present time is founded on universal irresponsibility. Under the old régime there was a very real responsibility, that of the king, but the custom of the constitution of the Third Republic makes the president

a cipher. In other words, there is no president (172). He has no duty but to do nothing and to say nothing. Responsibility is so divided, subdivided, and dispersed that no one can say of any man *is fecit*. The governing power is parliament, not the ministers, which is another way of saying that there is no responsibility.

However, M. Faguet's criticism of the French democracy is incisive and exceedingly interesting. Much of what he says in regard to the absence and apparent dread of responsibility both in the governmental organization and in the political and social customs of the French is true—and it is not peculiar to the French alone—but sometimes, notably in his criticism of the judiciary, his views are extreme and not founded on facts.

J. W. GARNER.

The Passing of the Great Reform Bill. By J. R. M. BUTLER.
(New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1914. Pp. xiii, 454.)

The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform. By GEORGE STEAD VEITCH,
with introduction by Ramsay Muir. (London: Constable and Company. Pp. xxxi, 397.)

Mr. Veitch's *The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform*, and Mr. Butler's *The Passing of the Great Reform Bill*, have a special interest for me—an interest greater than for most students of English history. It is an interest that can easily be explained; for in 1903 when my *Unreformed House of Commons* was published, I expressed the hope that it would be my fortune also to write the history of parliamentary reform. "At some future time," I then wrote, "I may write the history of the movement for parliamentary reform from the time of Queen Elizabeth to the acts of 1884–1885 extending the franchise in the counties and finally breaking up the old system under which knights of the shire were so long chosen to Westminster. Then I hope to trace the varying phases of the movement; how at one time it was sporadic, represented only by isolated movements for wider franchises in individual boroughs; how at other times, as during the Commonwealth, it was general; how it was aided by the American revolution; how partial success came in 1832; and how in later years the movement was revived and resulted in the reform acts of 1867 and 1884. The research for the history of the movement has already been done. At the outset it was my purpose to include in one work the